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BILL C-187t*
Julien D. P a y n e |
Som e four weeks ago  I was asked to  p repare a  paper on  Bill 
C-187 fo r p resen tation  to  the present assem bly. I have deliberated 
long an d  hard  on  the particu la r m ethod  o f  app roach  th a t I should 
follow  w ith regard  to  the form  an d  substance o f  my address. Since 
m any o f  you m ay n o t be very fam iliar w ith the conten ts o f  Bill C-187 
I reached the conclusion th a t perhaps the best m ethod w ould be to 
analyse the m ore im portan t sections o f  the  Bill in their num erical 
sequence. A ccordingly, I will first tu rn  to  section 2 o f  the Bill which 
constitu tes the in te rp re ta tion  section. It will be noted th a t in section 
2(a) an d  2(b) the term s “ ch ild” and  “ children  o f  the m arriage” are 
defined so as to  include the illegitim ate children o f  either spouse 
an d  the ad op ted  children o f  either spouse w here such children have 
been accepted as m em bers o f  the family a t the relevant tim e. It is 
possible th a t certain  difficulties may arise in consequence o f  these 
sta tu to ry  definitions. F o r exam ple the expression in loci parentis is 
ra th e r vague and  one m ay question  w hether P arliam ent m ight not 
have done better to  ad o p t the definition presented in the M atrim onial 
Proceedings A ct (New  Z ealand), 1963, section 2, w herein the phrase 
“ w ho was a m em ber o f  the family o f  the husband  and  wife a t the 
[relevant] tim e” is preferred  to  the m ore nebulous form ula in loci 
parentis. A difficulty which m ight arise by virtue o f  the definition 
o f  “ ch ildren  o f  the m arriage” set o u t in section 2(b) concerns the 
extent to  w hich the section may be in terpreted  to  include children 
over the age o f  sixteen years w ho are  incapable o f  m aintaining 
them selves by reason o f  being engaged in continu ing  education  at 
com m unity  colleges o r  universities. It is arguab le th a t the provisions 
o f  the  s ta tu te  do  not extend to  such children since the expression 
“ o r  o th e r  cause” in section 2(b)(ii) m ay be in terpreted  restrictively 
in light o f  the preceding w ords “ by reason o f  illness, [o r] d isability” .
Section 2(c) sets o u t a definition o f  collusion which quite clearly 
am ends the com m on law insofar as it provides th a t collusion does 
no t include an  agreem ent w hich provides fo r separation  between the 
parties. This clause is inserted in light o f  the  provisions o f  section 
4(1 )(e) w hich in troduce living ap a rt as a  g round fo r divorce in 
C anada . Beyond th is m odification o f  the existing law, the definition 
set o u t in section 2(c) could  be regarded as declara tory  o f  the com m on
f  Now, substantially, the Divorce Act (1968), 16 Eliz. II, c. 24.
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law as enuncia ted  in such cases as Johnson v. Johnson1 and  Emanuel 
v. Emanuel.2 T he s ta tu to ry  definition, however, explicitly restricts the 
opera tion  o f  the  doctrine  o f  collusion to  cases w herein “ an  agree­
m ent o r conspiracy to  subvert the adm in istra tion  o f  justice is es tab ­
lished” . T his definition, in my opin ion , operates to reduce the am bit 
o f  the concept o f  collusion m ore narrow ly than  was h itherto  per­
missible. Som e guidance in this contex t may be ob ta ined  by reference 
to  the present law in A ustralia  and  New Zealand. U nder the M a tri­
m onial C auses A ct (A ustra lia , 1959), and  the M atrim onial P roceed­
ings A ct (New  Z ealand , 1963), collusion operates as a  b ar only if 
there is “ in ten t to  cause a perversion o f  justice” .3
It should  be noted  th a t collusion is retained as an  abso lu te  bar 
to  relief by section 9(1 )(b) and  th a t it applies bo th  in respect o f  the 
grounds set ou t under section 3 and  those set ou t under section 4 
o f  Bill C-187.
Section 2 (d) provides th a t the b a r o f  condonation  does not 
include the con tin u atio n  o r resum ption  o f  cohab ita tion  during  a 
single period o f  not m ore th an  ninety days, where such cohab ita tion  
is con tinued  o r  resum ed w ith reconciliation as its p rim ary purpose. 
It should be noted  th a t co ndona tion  has now been m ade a d iscre­
tionary  b ar under section 9( l)(c) and  th a t, unlike collusion, it applies 
only in respect o f  the grounds fo r divorce set ou t under section 3 
o f  Bill C-187.
It is subm itted  th a t section 2(d) perm its only a single resum ption  
o f  cohab ita tion  and  th a t such period o f  cohab ita tion  m ust not 
continue for m ore th an  ninety days.
It may be noted th a t th is section is sim ilar but not identical to  
section 2 o f  the M atrim onial C auses A ct (England), 1963, w hich has 
been re-enacted in section 42(2) o f  the M atrim onial C auses Act 
(England, 1965). T he efficacy o f  this section m ay well be questioned 
in the light o f  recent English decision in M ackleworth  v. M ackle­
worth4; and  Brown v. Brown,5 w herein it was held th a t section 2(1) 
o f  the M atrim onial C auses A ct (England , 1963), extends to  cases 
where the con tinuation  o r resum ption  o f  cohab ita tion  is w ith a view 
to  reconciliation but no t to  cases w here the con tinuation  o r  resum p­
tion  o f  co h ab ita tio n  is the consequence o f  reconciliation. A ccord­
ingly, the section does no t create a p robationary  period during  which
1 (I960). 31 W.W.R. 403.
2 [1946J P. 115.
3 For judicial interpretation o f this clause, which corresponds substantially 
to the definition set out in section 2(c) o f Bill C-187, see Grose v. Grose, 
[1965] N.S.W .R. 429, Bell v. Bell, [1964] A.L.R. 29, and Barrott v. Barrott, 
[1964] N.Z.L.R. 988.
4 The Times, May 7th, 1964.
5 [1964] 3 W.L.R. 899.
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a  w ronged spouse w ho has been reconciled to  the w rongdoer can 
recall the  decision.
A lthough  such in te rp re ta tion  o f  the English legislation threatens 
to  reduce its efficacy, the  significance o f  the above decisions is no t so 
substan tia l in C an ad a  since co ndona tion  is an  abso lu te  b a r to  relief 
in England bu t only a d iscre tionary  b ar under section 9(1) (c) o f 
Bill C-187.
By the provisions o f  Bill C-187, ju risd ic tion  in divorce proceed­
ings is vested in the tria l division o r  b ranch  o f  the Suprem e C ourt 
o f  New Brunswick. T he question  m ight well be asked : does the 
vesting o f  ju risd ic tion  in the tria l division o r b ranch  o f  the Suprem e 
C o u rt o f  New Brunsw ick preclude a concu rren t ju risd ic tion  being 
exercised by the C oun ty  C ourts  p u rsuan t to  provincial legislation?
T he argum ents in favour o f  vesting a  concu rren t ju risd ic tion  
in the C oun ty  C ourts  a re  discussed in the R eport o f  the Roebuck 
C om m ittee a t page 20, w herein it is recom m ended th a t “ the C ounty  
C ourts  o f  all Provinces [should] be given ju risd ic tion  in divorce 
equally  and  concurren tly  w ith the Suprem e C o u rts  o f  the respective 
Provinces” . Briefly sta ted , the advantages o f  vesting concu rren t o r 
even exclusive divorce ju risd ic tion  in the C oun ty  C o u rts  center 
upon (1) the cost o f  proceedings and (2) the accessibility o f  the court.
W ith respect to  the  question  w hether the Province o f  New 
Brunswick m ay sta tu to rily  confer concurren t ju risd ic tion  in divorce 
and  ancillary m atters upon  the C ounty  C ourts , reference should  be 
m ade to  a recent decision o f  the Suprem e C o u rt o f  C anada , Attorney- 
General o f  British Columbia v. M cKenzie.6 There it was held th a t the 
Suprem e C ourt A m endm ent A ct, 1964 (B .C .), w hich conferred  ju ris ­
d iction upon the judges o f  C ounty  C ourts  to  try  divorce proceedings 
in their capacity  as local judges o f  the Suprem e C o u rt o f  British 
C olum bia was constitu tionally  valid.
T he issue to  be resolved, therefore, is w hether the decision in 
the aforem entioned  case will be abrogated  by enactm en t o f  Bill C-187. 
The decision in Attorney-General o f  British Columbia v. M cKenzie,1 
was given a t a tim e w hen the Federal P arliam ent had  no t occupied 
the field o f  divorce ju risd ic tion  pu rsuan t to  pow ers conferred  under 
section 101 o r  section 91(26) o f  the B .N .A . Act.
It m ay be o f  significance to  observe th a t in giving reasons for 
the decision, R itchie, J. s ta ted :
The Dominion Parliament has not seen fit to pass any legislation
pursuant to its power under section 101 o f the B.N.A. Act providing
for the establishment o f courts for the administration o f the law
6 [1965] S.C.R. 490.
7 Ibid.
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of 'marriage and divorce’ in British Columbia and I am accordingly 
in agreement that it is within the legislative competence o f the Legis­
lature of that Province to pass laws relating to the constitution, 
maintenance and organization o f such courts.«
W hile section 2(e) and  o th e r sections o f  Bill C-187 do no t 
constitu te  federal legislation enacted  “ pu rsu an t to  section 101 o f  the 
British N orth  A m erica A ct” , such legislation is enacted  p u rsu an t to  
section 91(26). It m ight therefore be contended  th a t, in accordance 
w ith general principle established by jud ic ia l au th o rity , occupation  
o f  this field by P arliam ent precludes any  provincial legislation a t 
least to  the extent th a t such provincial legislation “ clashes a t the 
level o f  law enfo rcem ent..’9
It m ight therefore be concluded th a t the pow er o f  the provinces 
to  enact legislation conferring  a concurren t divorce ju risd ic tion  upon  
the C oun ty  C o u rt is a t least o f  doub tfu l constitu tional validity. It 
may be argued , how ever, th a t provincial legislation conferring  divorce 
ju risd ic tion  upon  C ounty  C o u rt judges “ in their capacity  as local 
judges o f  the Suprem e C o u rt” w ould no t “ clash” w ith section 2(e) 
o f  Bill C-187 w hich confers ju risd ic tion  upon  the Suprem e C o u rt.
Grounds for Divorce
Section 3: Section 3 o f  Bill C-187 sets o u t the follow ing offences 
as g rounds fo r divorce a t the instance o f  the  innocent spouse:
1. ad u lte ry ;
2. sodom y, bestiality, rape o r  hom osexual ac t;
3. bigam y o r, quaere, po lygam y; and
4. physical o r  m ental cruelty  o f  such a kind as to  render 
in to lerab le con tinued  co h ab ita tio n  o f  the spouses.
T here is no need to  com m ent on  adu ltery  as a  g round  for 
divorce under the  new Bill since this merely projects the present 
g round  for relief.
W ith  respect to  the com m ission o f  sodom y, bestiality o r rape, 
it will be no ted  th a t these g rounds constitu te  a basis fo r divorce a t 
the instance o f  the innocent husband  o r  wife and  th a t the  term s o f  
the section do  not require a crim inal conviction to  have been secured. 
W ith respect to  the  offence o f  sodom y, it w ould ap p ear th a t inter- 
spousal sodom y m ay constitu te  a g round  for relief subject to  the 
d iscre tionary  b a r  o f  connivance.10
8 Ibid., at p. 495.
9 Attorney-General o f British Columbia v. Smith (1968), 65 D.L.R. (2d) 82 
(Fauteaux J.).
10 See Bampton v. Bampton, (1959] 1 W.L.R. 842 (C.A.).
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W ith respect to  the  term  “ engaged in a hom osexual a c t” , un ­
certain ty  w ould ap p ear to  be the w atchw ord  o f  this phrase. It is 
uncertain  bu t p robab le  th a t the phrase  includes acts o f  lesbianism  
and  th a t it is confined to  “ hom osexual ac ts”  which involve the  su r­
render o f  the  sexual organs.
W ith respect to  a divorce being ob ta inab le  on  p ro o f th a t the 
respondent has, since the ce lebration  o f  his o r her m arriage, gone 
th rough  a form  o f  m arriage w ith a n o th e r  person , it w ould appear 
p robab le  th a t the in ten t o f  P arliam en t was to  establish bigam y as a 
ground  for divorce. It w ould appear, however, th a t the language o f  
the section w ould be sufficiently b road  to  perm it the party  to  a 
m onogam ous m arriage to  o b ta in  a divorce w here his o r her spouse 
has entered  in to  a second polygam ous m arriage. T his conclusion is 
not inconsistent w ith the ruling in H yde  v. H yde, n  wherein it was 
held th a t recognition could  not be afforded to  a  first polygam ous 
m arriage for the purpose o f  g ran ting  divorce relief.
Section 3(d) provides th a t a petition  for divorce m ay be p re­
sented by either spouse on  the g round  th a t the responden t has, 
since the celebration  o f  the m arriage, treated  the petitioner with 
physical o r  m ental cruelty  o f  such a kind as to  render in to lerab le 
the continued  co hab ita tion  o f  the spouses.
In o rd er to  apprecia te  the  difficulty which may be encountered  
in in terpreting  this section, it will be necessary to  advert to  the  cu r­
rent definitions o f  cruelty ad o p ted  in the  C anad ian  provinces. S ub­
ject to  exception in A lberta  and  S askatchew an, “ cruelty” in relation 
to  m atrim onial causes has no t h itherto  been defined by sta tu te , but 
the governing principle w hich has been applied in C anada is tha t 
established in Russell v. Russelln , w herein it was held tha t in o rder 
to  constitu te  cruelty  the acts o r conduct com plained o f  m ust have 
caused “ injury to  life, lim b o r health , bodily o r  m ental, o r  a reason­
able apprehension  th e reo f” .
In A lberta  and  S askatchew an, cruelty  is defined by provincial 
sta tu tes fo r purposes o f  proceedings for alim ony and  judicial separa­
tion  as including “ conduc t w hich creates a danger to  life, lim b o r 
health  [and a lso ] any  course o f  conduct th a t in the op in ion  o f  the 
co u rt is grossly insulting o r  in to lerab le o r  o f  such a charac ter tha t 
the person seeking [relief] could not reasonably  be expected to  be 
willing to  live w ith the o th e r [spouse] after he o r  she has been 
guilty o f  such conduc t.” 13
11 (1866), L.R. I P. & D. 130.
12 [1897] A.C. 395.
13 See Domestic Relations Act, R.S.O., 1955, c. 89, s. 7; and Queen’s Bench 
Act, R.S.S., 1965, c. 73, s. 25(3).
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A significant issue which m erits consideration  is w hether section 
3(d) im plem ents the Russell v. Russell14 criterion  o r  w hether it p ro ­
jects  a w ider definition correspond ing  to  th a t in A lberta and  
S askatchew an.
It m ight be contended  tha t the w ords “ physical and  m ental 
cruelty”  imply adop tion  o f  the Russell15 criterion  and  th a t in o rder 
to  satisfy the cond itions set ou t in section 3(d) it will be necessary 
to  establish tw o factors:
(i) conduct causing injury to  health  o r  reasonable ap p re ­
hension thereof; and
(ii) th a t such conduct renders fu rthe r cohab ita tion  in to ler­
able.
Since am endm ent o f  this section appears som ew hat unlikely a t 
the present tim e, it w ould ap p ear th a t the suggested uncertain ty  o f  
section 3(d) m ust aw ait decision o f the courts.
W ith respect to  “ cruelty”  as a  g round fo r divorce, it w ould 
ap p ear th a t “ in tent to  cause in jury” , though  a relevant elem ent, is 
no longer a condition  precedent to  a  finding o f  m atrim onial cruelty .16
It will be noted tha t section 3(d) requires p ro o f o f  cruel conduct 
o f  such a kind as to  render in to lerab le “ the con tinued  cohab ita tion  
o f  the spouses” . A question  arises as to  w hether th is last phrase now 
requires the petitioning spouse to  prove a need fo r p ro tec tion  from  
the th rea t o f  fu ture m isconduct on  the part o f  the respondent spouse. 
In M eacher v. M eacher,17 it was held th a t a decree o f  divorce on 
the ground  o f  cruelty  should  be based on past behav iour and  th a t it 
was no t necessary to  have regard to  w hether there was a reasonable 
apprehension  o f  fu rthe r ill-treatm ent. O ne may question  w hether 
the in tention o f  P arliam ent in section 3(d) is to  affirm o r  ab rogate  
the possible application  o f  this decision in C anad ian  ju risd ic tions.
Section 4: Section 4(1) sets ou t add itiona l g rounds for divorce 
which include the responden t’s im prisonm ent, gross addiction  to 
alcohol o r  narcotics, d isappearance, o r incapacity  o r  refusal to 
consum m ate the m arriage. T im e does not perm it, how ever, a d e ­
tailed investigation o f  these provisions and 1 will accordingly d irect 
you r a tten tion  to  the m ore im portan t provision set ou t in section 
4(l)(e)(i). U nder th is section a petition  fo r divorce may be presented 
by either spouse w here the m arriage has perm anently  b roken  dow n 
by reason o f  the spouses having lived separate and  ap a rt fo r a period
14 [1897] A.C. 395.
15 Ibid.
16 See Gollins v. Gollins, [1963] 3 W.L.R. 176; Williams v. Williams, [1963]
3 W.L.R. 215 (H.L.)
17 [1946] P. 216.
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 91
o f  no t less th an  th ree years im m ediately preceding the presen tation  
o f  the petition  fo r any reason o th e r th a n  th a t set o u t in sub- 
parag rap h  (ii).
Since su b -parag raph  (ii) refers to  the  case w here the petitioner 
has deserted  the respondent, it w ould ap p e ar th a t the petitioner w ho 
has been deserted  by the responden t falls w ithin the am bit o f  sec­
tio n  4(l)(e)(i).
T he op era tio n  o f  this section, how ever, is no t confined to  the 
c ircum stance w here the petitioner has been deserted by the res­
ponden t fo r the designated period  o f  th ree years. It w ould thus 
a p p e ar th a t the section m ay afford  divorce relief in cases w here the 
separation  was by consent o f  the  parties o r  w here it was a conse­
quence o f  illness, w hether physical o r  m ental. Indeed, provided 
there is a  perm anen t m arriage breakdow n by reason o f  the spouses 
having been living separate  and  ap a r t fo r the  designated  period, the 
circum stances o r  causes leading to  the separation  w ould ap p ear 
irrelevant provided th a t they are  no t such as give rise to  the o p era ­
tio n  o f  the  sta tu to ry  b ar to  relief set o u t in section 9(1) (f).
F u rth e r observations m ay be m ade w ith respect to  the o pera tion  
o f  section 4(1) (e) (i):
1. To satisfy the  section it will be necessary to  establish (i) th a t 
there has been a perm anen t breakdow n o f  the m arriage and
(ii) th a t the perm anent b reakdow n o f  the m arriage occurred  by 
reason o f  the spouses having been living separate  and  ap a r t fo r 
the designated  period. By virtue o f  section 4(2), however, p ro o f 
o f  separation  fo r the designated period  will require the courts 
to  p resum e a perm anen t b reakdow n o f  the  m arriage, but it is 
subm itted  th a t such a p resum ption  m ay be provisional an d  not 
conclusive.
If  section 4(2) is in terpreted  as creating  a conclusive pre­
sum ption  o f  m arriage breakdow n on p ro o f o f  separation  fo r the  
designated period, then  difficulties will inevitably arise w here 
the spouses have lived separate  and  ap a r t under com pulsion, 
as, fo r exam ple, w here the husband  has been separated  from  
his wife pu rsuan t to  m ilitary service. Such difficulties could , o f  
course, be resolved by a restrictive in te rp re ta tion  o f  the sep ara­
tion  provision in section 4(l)(e)(i) bu t it w ould ap p ear w iser 
and  perhaps m ore p robab le  fo r the  courts  to  in te rp re t section 
4(2) as giving rise to  only a provisional p resum ption  o f  m arriage 
breakdow n.
2. F o r the  purposes o f  in terpreting  section 4(l)(e)(i), a  period  in 
w hich the parties have been living separate  an d  ap a r t is no t 
in te rrup ted  o r  term inated  by reason (a) th a t e ither spouse has 
becom e incapable o f  form ing o r  having an  in ten tion  o r  volition
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to  live separate  an d  a p a r t ;  o r  (b) by reason o f  a  resum ption  o f  
c o h a b ita tio n  during  a  single period o f  no t m ore th an  ninety 
days w ith reconciliation  as its p rim ary p u rp o se .18
3. T he phrase “ separate  and  a p a r t”  is susceptible to  tw o in te rp re ta ­
tions. In m any A m erican sta tu tes wherein this ph rase  is adop ted  
the courts  require physical separation  o f  the spouses to  such a 
degree as is m anifest to  the  local com m unity . T he m inority  
op in ion  in the U nited  S tates asserts, how ever, th a t the essential 
issue is not w hether the  spouses are living under separate  roofs 
bu t ra th e r w hether they are living separate  lives. T his la tte r 
view w ould ap p ear to  receive support from  relevant A ustralian  
decisions.19 Som e fu rth e r support fo r this conclusion m ay also 
be inferred from  the decision o f  the C ourt o f  A ppeal o f  O n tario  
in J. B. v. A. W. B.20, w herein it was held th a t a  finding o f  
desertion  m ay be m ade w here the household has ceased to  be 
in substance one household  o r  one hom e.
4. It will be observed th a t a  spouse may petition  fo r divorce under 
section 4(1), parag raphs (a) to  (d), w here the respondent has 
been im prisoned fo r a designated period, grossly addicted  to  
drugs o r alcohol, has d isappeared , o r  w here the  m arriage has 
no t been consum m ated  by reason o f  the  responden t’s disability  
o r  wilful refusal to  consum m ate the m arriage A lthough  the 
aforem entioned  p arag raphs clearly preclude a rem edy under 
such parag raphs to  the spouse under disability , it is open to  
argum ent th a t such spouse m ay petition  for divorce pu rsuan t 
to  the provisions o f  section 4(1) (e) (i) [or (ii)] since, as stated 
previously, w here a perm anen t m arriage breakdow n occurs by 
reason o f  the  spouses living separate  an d  ap a rt fo r the designated 
period , the circum stances o r  causes leading to  such separation  
w ould ap p ear irrelevant p rovided th a t they do  not justify  refusal 
o f  relief p u rsu an t to  the abso lu te  b a r  under section 9(1) (f).
5. T he availability  o f  relief under sections 4(1) (e) (i) an d  (ii) is 
circum scribed by the  provisions o f  section 9 (1) (f) w hich p ro ­
vide th a t w here a decree o f  divorce is sought by reason o f  the 
circum stances described in section 4(1) (e), it shall be the duty 
o f  the  cou rt to  refuse the  decree if the  g ran ting  o f  it w ould be 
unduly harsh  o r unjust to  either spouse o r  w ould prejudicially 
affect the  m aking o f  reasonable arrangem ents fo r the  m ain ten ­
ance o f  e ither spouse. T his provision is sim ilar bu t n o t identical 
w ith section 37 (1) o f  the  M atrim onial C auses A ct (A ustra lia ,
18 S ees. 9(3).
19 E.g., Murphy v. Murphy, [1962] N.S.W . Rt. 417; Crabtree v. Crabtree (1963),
5 F.L.R. 307.
20 [1958] O.R. 281.
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1959), an d  th e  uncertain ty  a ttach ing  to  the  phrase  “ unduly  
harsh  o r  un just”  m ay perhaps be reduced, bu t no t elim inated , 
by reference to  the in te rp re ta tion  accorded  to  the  phrase “ harsh  
and  oppressive”  by the  A ustra lian  courts. It w ould  ap p e ar th a t 
the  phrase requires p ro o f  o f  som e substan tia l detrim en t as a 
result o f  the  gran ting  o f  a  decree, and  generalities such as the 
real o r im agined stigm a o f  divorce o r  the  loss o f  the m arriage 
sta tus are  no t em braced  by the  phrase . T hus, in M cD onald  v. 
M cDonald21 H errin , C. J. sta ted :
Each o f the two words in the phrase 'harsh and oppressive’ must 
be given its meaning. The test o f harshness and oppressiveness is 
subjective and must relate to the respondent. What is envisaged is 
not some such concept in the abstract or as applying generally to 
others, or even to the reasonable man or woman. The phrase connotes 
some substantial detriment to the party before the court. It is not 
satisfied by argument based on generalities or on social philosophy 
or that the petitioner is at fault or by suggested injustice, e.g., loss 
of status or such as would be said to result from unsuccessful opposi­
tion by the respondent.**
It w ould fu rth e r ap p e ar th a t the  decree will not be refused solely 
on the basis o f  a spouse’s conscientious o r  religious objections 
to  divorce.23 A decree m ight well be refused, how ever, w here the 
petitioner has neglected to  m ake reasonab le an d  equ itab le 
arrangem ents for the  d isposition  o f  m atrim onia l assets,24 o r  
w here the  issue o f  the  decree w ould unjustifiably deprive a 
spouse o f  pension o r  insurance rights, dow er, o r  o f  righ ts under 
fam ily inheritance legislation.
Jurisdiction of Court
Section 5 o f  Bill C-187 provides th a t the cou rt o f  any province 
has ju risd ic tion  in divorce if the  petitioner is dom iciled in C anada  
an d  e ither th e  petitioner o r  the responden t has been ord inarily  
resident in the province fo r a  period o f  a t least one year im m ediately 
preceding the presen tation  o f  the  petition  and  has actually  resided 
in the province fo r a t least ten  m onths o f  th a t period. T his section 
reflects a  fundam ental change from  the present basis o f  ju risd ic tion  
w hich is prem ised upon  p ro o f  o f  dom icile w ithin the ju risd ic tion  
w herein proceedings a re  institu ted . Its significance becom es even 
grea ter w hen the  section is read together w ith the provisions set ou t 
in section 6 (1) w hich sta tes th a t the  dom icile o f  a  m arried  w om an 
shall be determ ined  as if she were unm arried  and , if  she is a m inor, 
as if  she had  ob ta ined  her m ajority .
21 (1964), 64 S.R. (N.S.W .) 435.
22 Ibid.
23 See Painter v. Painter (1963), 4 F.L.R. 216, at p. 220.
24 See McDonald v. McDonald ( 1964), 64 S.R. (N.S.W .) 435.
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Som e uncertain ty  will inevitably  exist over the  m eaning o f  the 
ph rase  “ o rd inarily  residen t”  b u t gu idance in in te rp re ting  th is phrase 
m ay be ob ta ined  from  the decision o f  K arm insk i, J . in Stransky  v. 
Stransky25, w herein it was suggested th a t absences from  the ju risd ic­
tio n  w hether on  business o r  fo r pleasure w ould n o t necessarily break  
the  period o f  o rd inary  residence.26
T o  avoid  possible difficulties arising  from  the above ju risd ic­
tional ru le w here petitions fo r divorce a re  pending in tw o courts, 
provision is m ade in section 5 (2) w hereby the  co u rt to  w hich a 
petition  was first presented has exclusive ju risd ic tion  to  g ran t relief 
betw een the parties. It is questionab le w hether this provision ad e­
quately  solves the problem  o f  conflicting ju risd ic tions an d  it m ight 
well have been be tte r to  leave a  general d iscretion  in the courts  to  
o rd er a  stay o f  proceedings.
The Recognition of Foreign Decrees
Section 6 o f  Bill C-187 w ould ap p e ar to  preserve the  presen t 
rules regulating  recognition  o f  foreign decrees an d  fu rther provides 
th a t recognition  will now be afforded to  a foreign decree issuing 
from  a  co u rt w hich exercises ju risd ic tion  on  the basis o f  the w ife’s 
separate  dom icile. T his extension o f  the  existing com m on law rule 
is a necessary coro llary  to  section 5 (1) and  6 (1) w hich enable a 
C an ad ian  co u rt to  exercise ju risd ic tion  in divorce on  the  basis o f  
the  w ife’s separate  dom icile.
W ith respect to  the recognition  o f  foreign decrees, tim e does 
no t perm it an  exam ination  o f  the  ex ten t to  w hich C anad ian  C ourts  
m ay ad o p t the reasoning o f  the H ouse o f  L ords in Indyka v. Indyka21, 
w herein it was suggested th a t the  criterion  fo r recognition should  
depend upon the existence o f  a  substan tia l connection  betw een the 
petitioner an d /o r  responden t and  the foreign ju risd ic tion .
Duties of Solicitors and Courts respecting possibility of reconciliation
Section 7 im poses a  du ty  on  solicitors to  advise d ivorce clients 
o f  the reconciliation  provisions set o u t in Bill C-187, to  in form  the 
client o f  m arriage counselling facilities available, and  to  discuss w ith 
th e  client the possibility o f  reconciliation  w ith his o r  her spouse. 
It is a lso  the  du ty  o f  a barris te r an d  solicitor to  certify on  any  petition  
for divorce th a t he has duly d ischarged the above obligations. It will 
be no ted  th a t there is no  s ta tu to ry  sanction  im posed for non- 
com pliance w ith section 7 (1) an d  it m ight well be con tended  th a t 
the provision will have little p ractica l effect and  constitu tes merely
25 [1954] P. 428.
26 See also the definition accorded to this phrase in Thomson v. M.N.R., [1946]
S.C.R. 209.
27 11967] 2 AU E.R. 689.
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“ the sugar-coating  w hich rendered  the  Bill accep tab le to  the  sensitive 
public pa la te” . A m ore effective provision aim ed a t p rom oting  recon­
cilia tion  betw een the  spouses is set o u t in section 8 o f  Bill C-187 
w hich requires the co u rt, before proceeding to  the  hearing o f  evi­
dence, to  d irect such inquiries to  the  petitioner an d  w here the 
responden t is present, to  the  responden t as the co u rt deem s necessary 
in  o rd er to  ascerta in  w hether a  possibility  exists o f  m atrim onia l 
reconciliation. T he section fu rth e r provides th a t if  a t  th a t tim e o r  
any  la ter tim e in  the  proceedings it appears to  the co u rt th a t there 
is a possibility o f  such reconciliation , the  co u rt shall ad jo u rn  the 
proceedings to  afford  the  parties an  o p p o rtu n ity  to  becom e recon­
ciled, and  w ith the  consen t o f  the parties o r  in  the d iscretion  o f  the 
cou rt, nom inate  a person to  endeavour to  assist th e  parties w ith a 
view to  th e ir  possible reconciliation . Section 8 (2) provides th a t 
w here fourteen  days have elapsed from  the  da te  o f  any  ad jou rnm en t 
under sub-section 1, e ither o f  the parties m ay app ly  to  the  cou rt 
to  have the  proceedings resum ed.
It m ay well be th a t the  pow er to  o rd er a n  ad jo u rn m en t p u r­
su an t to  section 8 (1 )  will n o t be exercised very frequently . T hus, if 
the practice ad o p ted  in  A ustra lia , w here co rrespond ing  legislation 
exists, is follow ed, the  occasions upon  w hich an  ad jo u rn m en t will 
be o rdered  will be few. In A ustralia , w here the  pow er to  o rd er  such 
ad jou rnm en ts has existed since 1961, only fifteen cases w ere reported  
up to  the  end  o f  1965 in w hich th is p rocedure was adop ted  and  
reconciliations were effected in only tw o o f  these cases.
Bars to Divorce
Before com m enting upon  the  bars to  divorce specifically set 
o u t in section 9, it should  be no ted  th a t Bill C-187 includes no 
section com parab le  to  section 5 o f  the M arriage an d  D ivorce A ct,28 
m aking it m an d ato ry  fo r the  co u rt to  g ran t the  decree w here no 
sta tu to ry  abso lu te  o r  d iscre tionary  bars are  established. N o tw ith ­
stand ing  the  om ission o f  such provision, how ever, it is subm itted  
th a t th e  only abso lu te  an d  d iscre tionary  bars to  relief a re  those 
expressly set o u t in Bill C-187. T hus the trad itio n a l d iscre tionary  
bars o f  the pe titioner’s adu ltery , cruelty , desertion , delay an d  conduct 
conducing  w ould ap p e ar no  longer applicab le even in respect o f  the 
grounds o f  divorce set o u t in section 3, the  offence section.29
Section 9 (1) (a) o f  Bill C-187 provides th a t it shall be the  du ty  
o f  the co u rt on  a petition  for divorce to  refuse a decree based solely 
upon  the  consent, adm issions o r defau lt o f  the parties o r  e ither o f  
them , an d  no t to  g ran t a decree except a fte r tria l w hich shall be
28 R.S.C., 1952, c. 176.
29 But see Williams v. Williams and Des Roches (1967), 52 M.P.R. 368 (P.E.I.).
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by ju d g e  w ithou t a ju ry . T he language o f  this section w ould be 
wide enough to  preclude any  undefended petitions for divorce, but 
this could  n o t have been the  in tent o f  the  Federal P arliam ent since 
the possibility  o f  the  respondent en tering  no defence is clearly 
con tem plated  by the provisions set o u t in sections 8 (1) an d  4 (1) (c). 
It is subm itted  th a t the  object o f  section 9 is to  secure a  trial o f  the 
issues in the court. It w ould ap p ear th a t adm issions m ade p rio r to 
the  d ivorce proceedings o r  on  an  exam ination  fo r discovery are 
adm issib le evidence but th a t such evidence is n o t self-sufficient to  
justify  the issue o f  a divorce decree. It is fu rth e r  subm itted  th a t 
section 9 (1) (a) is no t intended to  preclude a  divorce being gran ted  
w here the sole evidence adduced  is an  adm ission in the witness box 
during  the course o f  the divorce proceedings.30
It is unnecessary to discuss section 9 (1) (b) in any  detail since 
1 have already  com m ented upon the abso lu te  b a r  o f  collusion in the 
discussion o f  section 2 (c). It should be noted , how ever, th a t section 
9 (1) (b) w ould ap p ear to  place the onus on the  p la in tiff to  prove 
the absence o f  collusion, and  th is constitu tes a  reversal o f  the 
previous rule o f  law on the point. T he position w ould now seem to 
co rrespond  w ith th a t in England w here it has been held th a t there 
is a p resum ption  against collusion, th a t it is p rovisional only an d  is 
coun terbalanced  by circum stances w hich lead to  a  reasonable suspi­
cion thereof, w hereupon it falls upon the  p la in tiff to  negative 
co llusion .31
Section 9 (1) (c) provides th a t the  co u rt m ust satisfy itself as 
to  absence o f  condonation  and  connivance on the  part o f  the peti­
tioner and  m ust dism iss a  petition  if the petitioner has condoned  o r 
connived a t the ac t o r conduct com plained o f  unless, in the opinion 
o f  the  co u rt, the public in terest w ould be better served by gran ting  
the decree. It will be noted th a t co ndona tion  an d  connivance have 
been converted  from  absolu te to  d iscre tionary  bars to  relief. The 
circum stances w hich will govern the exercise o f  the  c o u rt’s discre­
tion  m ay, bu t will not necessarily, co rrespond  to  the cond itions set 
ou t in Blunt v. Blunt*2. It will be observed th a t these bars apply  
only in respect o f  petitions founded upon the offences designated 
in section 3. They have no app lica tion  w ith respect to  divorces 
sought on  the  grounds stipulated  in section 4. As in the case o f 
co llusion, the  onus w ould ap p ear to  rest on  the  petitioner to  prove 
an  absence o f  condonation  o r connivance.
30 See Elliott v. Elliott, [1933] O.R. 206, wherein the term “admissions” in 
Rule 14 o f the Rules respecting the Conduct o f Matrimonial Causes (1933) 
was held to refer to admissions made in the pleadings or by counsel at trial 
and did not include admissions made on examination for discovery.
31 See Emanuel v. Emanuel, [1946] P. 115.
32 [1943] A.C. 517.
U.N.B. LAW  JOURNAL 97
It has already  been observed th a t section 2 (d) restricts the 
definition o f  co ndona tion  so as to  exclude the circum stance w here 
the parties resum e cohab ita tion  fo r a  single period o f  no t m ore 
than  ninety days and  such co h ab ita tio n  is continued  o r  resum ed 
w ith reconciliation as its prim ary  purpose.
A significant question  th a t arises w ith respect to  the discre­
tionary  b ar o f  condona tion  is w hether section 9 (1) (c) is consistent 
w ith the provision set ou t in section 9 (2) which reads “ any  ac t 
o r conduct th a t has been condoned  is no t capable o f  being revived 
so as to  constitu te  a ground  fo r divorce described in section 3.”  It 
is subm itted  th a t the aforem entioned  subsections are not inconsistent 
and  th a t their respective effects m ay best be illustrated  by reference 
to  a  specific fact situation . C onsider the case where a husband 
com m its adultery  and  his wife condones the offence but the husband 
thereafter resum es association w ith the  adulteress and  acts o f  
intim acy falling short o f  adu ltery  occur. U nder existing law the 
wife m ay com plain  o f  the condoned  adultery  by asserting a revival 
o f  the offence by reason o f  the h usband ’s subsequent conduct. I f  
the co u rt accepts the wife’s assertion and  finds the condoned  offence 
revived, then a decree o f  divorce m ust issue— the abso lu te bar o f  
condona tion  has been erased by o pera tion  o f  the doctrine o f  revival.33 
Let us now consider the above facts in light o f  the provisions o f  
section 9 (1) (c) and  9 (2). U nder these provisions the wife in the 
above circum stances w ould not be entitled  to  a decree o f  divorce 
as o f  right since the doctrine o f  revival has been abolished by reason 
o f  the provision set ou t in section 9 (2). T he cou rt w ould accordingly 
be called upon  to  exercise its discretion  in accordance w ith the co n d i­
tions set o u t in section 9 (1 )  (c).
W ith respect to  the bar o f  connivance set o u t under section 
9 (1 )  (c), it has already been observed th a t this is now a  d iscre tionary  
bar and  th a t the courts  in exercising the  discretion  m ay, bu t will not 
necessarily, take in to  account the considerations set o u t in Blunt v. 
Blunt,34 It should  be fu rthe r noted th a t the bar o f  connivance is 
now extended beyond the offence o f  adu ltery  to  all m atrim onial 
offences set o u t under section 3 o f  Bill C-187. It is p robab le  th a t in 
exercising the discretion  in respect o f  the  b ar o f  connivance, the  
courts will m ore readily gran t a divorce in cases o f  passive connivance 
but there is, o f  course, no th ing  w hich precludes the cou rt from  
gran ting  a divorce even though  active connivance is established. In 
all cases, how ever, the court m ust be satisfied th a t the public interest 
w ould be better served by gran ting  the decree.
W here a decree o f  divorce is sought pu rsuan t to  the g rounds 
set o u t under section 4, it is the du ty  o f  the cou rt under section 9 (1 )
33 See Tilley v. Tillev, (1949) P. 240, at p. 260 (C.A.).
34 [1943] A.C. 517.
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(d) to  refuse the decree if  there is a  reasonable expectation  th a t co­
hab ita tio n  will occur o r be resum ed w ithin  a reasonably foreseeable 
period. It will be observed th a t un d er this provision the  co u rt must 
refuse a  decree if  it concludes th a t there is a reasonable expectation  
o f  resum ption  o f  cohab ita tion  w ith in  the  foreseeable fu tu re . In the 
event th a t the  cou rt is in do u b t as to  possibility o f a resum ption  o f  
co h ab ita tio n , it w ould seem qu ite  ap p ro p ria te  for the c o u r t to  o rder 
an  ad jou rnm en t o f  proceedings p u rsu an t to  the provisions set o u t 
in section 8 in o rd er th a t the o p p o rtu n ity  for reconciliation  o f  the 
spouses m ay be duly considered. It will be noted th a t th e  opera tion  
o f  section 9 (1) (d) is confined to  the circum stance w here a decree 
for divorce is sought pu rsu an t to  the grounds set o u t under sec­
tion  4, and  it has no  operative effect in respect o f  the g rounds set 
o u t under section 3. It is subm itted  th a t section 9 (1) (d) will have a 
strictly  lim ited app lica tion , fo r w here it is established th a t the 
m arriage has b roken  dow n fo r the  reasons designated in  section 4, 
the natu ra l inference to  be d raw n from  th is is th a t there is no reason­
ab le expectation  o f  a  resum ption  o f  m atrim onial co h ab ita tio n . It is 
fu rtherm ore difficult to  envisage the  cou rt refusing a decree pursuan t 
to  the provision to  section 9 (1) (d) in cases w here the pe titio n er has 
declared an  unw illingness to  resum e cohab ita tion .
Section 9 (1) (e) provides th a t w here a decree o f  divorce is 
sought on  the  g rounds set o u t in  section 4, the court m ust refuse 
the decree if  there a re  children  o f  the m arriage and th e  gran ting  
o f  the  decree w ould prejudicially  affect the m aking o f  reasonable 
arrangem ents fo r the ir m aintenance. T he phrase “ ch ild ren  o f  the 
m arriage”  is defined in section 2 (b) w hich has been previously  dis­
cussed. L ike section 9 (1) (d), the b a r  to  divorce arising  under 
p a rag rap h  (e) applies only w here a divorce decree is sough t pu rsuan t 
to  the g rounds established under section 4. It is, in m y opinion, 
u n fo rtuna te  th a t the pro tec tion  o f  children’s rights is confined to  
the circum stance w here a decree is sought pursuant to  th e  grounds 
established under section 4. It is arguab le  tha t where no  adequate  
arrangem ents have been m ade fo r the m aintenance o f  ch ildren  o f  
the  m arriage the co u rt m ust refuse the decree and has no  pow er to  
ad jo u rn  the proceedings pending the  m aking o f  reasonable a rran g e­
m ents fo r m aintenance o f  such children . In practice, how ever, the 
cou rts  will no d o u b t o rd er an  ad jou rnm en t where reasonab le a rran g e­
m ents have no t been m ade fo r the  m aintenance o f  such children  a t 
the tim e when the divorce decree is sought. It is interesting to  con tem ­
pla te  the effect o f  th is section in a no t uncom m on circum stance which 
arises w hen the  party  to  a  divorce proceeding contem plates an  early 
rem arriage. T he prospect o f  early  rem arriage following the  divorce 
decree m ay clearly affect the provision o f  reasonable m ain tenance 
fo r the children o f  the dissolved m arriage, for the d ivorcee will be 
natu ra lly  inclined to  favour the com peting  claim s o f  his second wife
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and  the children b o rn  o f  his m arriage to  her. It is uncertain  w hether 
the in ten t o f  P arliam ent was directed a t th is specific circum stance 
but no d o u b t the issue will require due consideration  by the courts 
in the days th a t lie ahead .
It is uncertain  w hether an  onus falls upon  the petitioner under 
section 9 (1) (e) to  satisfy the cou rt th a t the issue o f  a  decree w ould 
not prejudically affect the  m aking  o f  reasonable arrangem ents for 
the m ain tenance o f  such children  and  w hether such onus, if it 
exists, is duly satisfied by the  pe titioner’s sw orn evidence as to  
arrangem ents m ade for the children . It could be argued th a t the 
Bill requires the co u rt o t go beyond its o rd inary  jud ic ia l functions 
in acting  upon  a prim a fa c ie  case established by uncon trad ic ted  sw orn 
evidence and  th a t the court m ust exercise an  inquisito rial function  
in o rd er to  give efficacy to  this provision. W ith respect to  a not 
dissim ilar provision set ou t in the  M atrim onial C auses A ct (A ustra lia , 
1959), as am ended in 1965, the op in ion  has been extra-judicially  
expressed by the C h ief Justice o f  the Suprem e C o u rt o f  T asm ania 
th a t the function  o f  the C o u rt rem ains jud ic ia l and  no t inquisitorial 
and accordingly there is no  independent du ty  im posed on the 
C ourt to  take active steps itself to  inquire in to  the effect o f  a decree 
upon the provision o f  reasonable m ain tenance for children o f  the 
m arriage.
Section 9 (1) (f) provides th a t w here a  decree is sought under 
section 4 (1) (e), the  court m ust refuse the decree if the  gran ting  o f  
it w ould be unduly harsh o r unjust to  either spouse o r w ould p re­
judicially  affect the  m aking o f  such reasonable arrangem ents for the 
m aintenance o f  either spouse as are  necessary in the  circum stance». 
W ith respect to  section 9 (1) (f), the bar s t  >ut in this section 
applies only w ith respect to  divorce decrees w hich are  sought 
pu rsuan t to  section 4 (1) (i) and  (ii). T he question  arises under this 
sub-section, as under the provision set o u t in p arag raph  (e), as to  
the effect o f  possible rem arriage opera ting  to  prejudicially affect 
reasonable arrangem ents fo r the m aintenance o f  either spouse to 
the dissolved m arriage.
W ith respect to  the opera tion  o f  the clause “ unduly harsh  o r 
un just” , it is possible to  contem plate circum stances w here a  decree 
sought pu rsu an t to  section 4 will be refused if the cause o f  separation  
arose by reason o f  the physical o r  m ental ill-health o f  a spouse. 
H ow ever, it w ould be unwise a t this tim e to  a ttem p t to  form ulate 
any  criterion  as to  the app lica tion  o f  this fo rm ula in such cases. As 
to  the m ore general significance o f  this phrase, this has already  been 
discussed in rela tion  to  section 4 (1 )  (e).
W ith  respect to  the opera tion  o f  section 9 (3), it is provided 
th a t, fo r purposes o f  in terpreting  section 4 (1 )  (e), a  period  in w hich 
the parties have been living separate  and  ap a rt is not in te rrup ted  o r
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term inated  (a) by reason th a t e ither spouse has becom e incapable 
o f  fo rm ing o r  having an  in ten tion  o r volition to  live separate  and  
a p a r t;  o r  (b) by reason o f  a resum ption o f  cohab ita tion  during a 
single period o f  no t m ore th an  ninety days w ith reconciliation as 
its p rim ary  purpose. T he object o f  parag raph  (a) is to  prevent in te r­
rup tion  o f  the period o f  desertion  o r  separation  arising  by reason 
o f  supervening insanity  on the p a rt o f  either spouse. W ith respect 
to  the opera tion  o f  parag rap h  (b), sim ilar considerations to  those 
set o u t in relation  to  section 2 (d) w ould ap p ear applicable. It is 
no tew orthy  th a t in ca lculating  the du ra tio n  o f  the period o f separa­
tion o r  desertion pu rsu an t to  section 4 (1) (e), the period o f  not 
m ore th an  ninety days du ring  which the parties cohab it w ith a 
view to reconciliation is to  be included.
Corollary Relief
Sections 10 to  12 o f  Bill C-187 em pow er the co u rt to  m ake 
orders fo r interim  alim ony, perm anent m aintenance and  the custody  
o f  children. P erhaps the m ost significant change arising under sec­
tions 10 and  11 is the  legislative recognition o f  m utual ob ligations 
o f  m aintenance between the spouses. H ithe rto , the courts  have been 
em pow ered to  o rd er m ain tenance only in favour o f  the wife but the 
position  has been changed under sections 10 and  11 an d  the cou rt 
by virtue o f  these provisions m ay now o rd er interim  o r  perm anent 
relief to  either spouse. A fu rth e r substan tia l change arising by v irtue 
o f  section 11 is th a t the co u rt is now em pow ered to  o rd er either 
spouse to  pay a lum p sum as d istinguished from  a periodic sum  for 
the m aintenance o f  a spouse an d -o r the child ren  o f  the m arriage. 
It is no tew orthy  th a t section 11 contains no term s lim iting the d u ra ­
tion o f  m ain tenance o rders and  it w ould thus ap p ear th a t d u ra tion  
is a m atte r for the discreation o f  the cou rt to  be exercised having 
regard to  the  conduc t o f  the  parties and  the  cond ition , m eans and  
o th e r  circum stances o f  the parties. T he adu ltery  o f  a spouse does 
not preclude an aw ard  o f  m aintenance a lthough  it m ay be relevant 
fo r consideration  by the cou rt.
W ith respect to  the opening  clause o f  section 11 (I) , which 
reads “ upon gran ting  a decree nisi” , it w ould ap p ear th a t the use o f  
this phrase in o th e r  legislation has been broadly  in terpreted  to  adm it 
an  app lica tion  fo r m ain tenance subsequent to  the decree providing 
th a t such app lica tion  is m ade w ithin a reasonable tim e.35
Section 11 (2) em pow ers the cou rt to vary o r  rescind a m ain­
tenance o rd er m ade in p rio r proceedings and  instructs the cou rt to  
exercise its d iscretion  having regard to  the conduct o f  the parties 
since the m aking o f  the  o rd er  o r  any change in the ir cond ition , m eans
35 The meaning o f the phrase is duly considered in the second edition o f  
Power on Divorce (1964, Toronto), at pp. 535 and 649.
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o r  o th e r  circum stances. It is w orthy  o f  observation  th a t no express 
reference is m ade in th is section to  the  effect o f  the rem arriage o f  
e ither spouse. P resum ably, therefore, the effect o f  such rem arriage 
will m erely be a relevant consideration  to  the exercise o f  the c o u r t’s 
general d iscretion.
Section 13 provides th a t every decree o f  divorce shall be a 
decree nisi in the first instance and  no such decree shall be m ade 
abso lu te until three m onths have elapsed from  the g ran ting  o f  the 
decree nisi. E xceptions are adm itted  to  this general provision by 
v irtue o f  subsection 2 w here special circum stances render it in the 
public in terest th a t the  decree abso lu te be gran ted  before the exp ira­
tion o f  the aforem entioned  period. Subsection 3 provides fo r in te r­
vention in a divorce cause by any person and  effects no substan tia l 
am endm ent in cu rren t practices. Subsection 4 provides th a t the 
respondent to  a divorce cause may ob ta in  a decree abso lu te  in the 
event o f  the petitioner's  neglect to  convert the  decree nisi in to  a 
decree abso lu te . It m ay be noted  th a t under this section no pow er 
is conferred upon the respondent to  apply  to  have the decree vacated.
Section 14 stipulates th a t the decree o f  divorce gran ted  pu rsu an t 
to  Bill C-187 an d  an  o rd er m ade pu rsu an t to  sections 10 o r  11 shall 
have legal effect th ro u g h o u t C anada . T o  facilita te the enforcem ent 
o f  ancillary  o rders m ade pu rsu an t to  section 10 o r 11, section 15 
fu rth e r provides th a t o rders m ay be registered in any  superio r co u rt 
in C an ad a  an d  may be enforced in a like m anner as an  o rd er o f  th a t 
superio r court.
Section 16 provides th a t w here a  decree o f  divorce has been 
m ade abso lu te  under this ac tion , e ither party  to  the form er m arriage 
m ay m arry  again . It is p robab le  th a t the in ten t o f  this section is to 
affirm the principle set ou t in Re Schepull36, wherein it was held th a t 
the re la tionsh ip  o f  affinity will be term inated  by divorce. It is su b ­
m itted, how ever, th a t such in tent w ould have been better realized 
had the  provision stipu lated  th a t w here a decree o f  divorce has been 
m ade abso lu te , “ it shall be lawful fo r the  respective parties there to  
to  m arry  again  as if  the  p rio r m arriage had been dissolved by d e a th ’’.
A ppeals in divorce proceedings are  regulated by the provisions 
set o u t in sections 17 and  18 o f  Bill C-187, w hich w ould ap p e ar to  
be self-explanatory. Suffice it to  observe th a t by virtue o f  section 17, 
no appeal m ay be m ade against a decree abso lu te .37 Sections 19 
and  20 are concerned w ith the prom ulgation  o f  rules o f  co u rt and  
the preservation  o f  provincial laws o f  evidence and  w ould ap p e a r  to  
present no real difficulties w ith respect to  the ir in te rp re ta tion .
36 [19541 O.R. 67.
37 For consideration as to whether this rule amends the existing law. see Power 
on Divorce (1964, 2nd ed., Toronto) at pp. 149 to 152.
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Section 21 provides th a t w here a  person has been appo in ted  by 
the  co u rt under section 8 to  assist the parties in achieving reconcilia­
tion , such person  is no t com peten t o r  com pellable in any  legal 
p roceedings to  disclose any  adm ission  o r  com m unication  m ade to  
him  in his capacity  as the  nom inee o f  the court. Subsection 2 fu rthe r 
provides th a t evidence o f  any th ing  said o r  any adm ission  o r  com ­
m unication  m ade in the course o f  a n  endeavour to  assist the  parties 
to  a  m arriage w ith  a  view to  the ir possible reconciliation is no t 
adm issible in any  legal proceedings. T he language o f  subsection  2 
is w ide enough to  em brace adm issions o r  com m unications m ade to  
persons o th e r th a n  nom inated  counsellors un d er section 8 bu t it 
is doub tfu l w hether the  in ten t o f  the  Federal P arliam ent was to  
extend the privilege to  a  m ore general class.
T he reason  fo r this section is clear. It recognizes th a t if  re­
conciliation  between litigating  parties is to  be achieved th rough  
counselling, then  it is im perative th a t the  parties an d  the counsello r 
feel free to  discuss all pertinen t facts w ithou t the  th rea t o f  such facts 
being held aga inst the parties in  subsequent litigation.
It is unnecessary fo r me to  spend tim e analysing the con ten ts 
o f  section 22 an d  23 w hich regulate the ju risd ic tion  in respect o f  
d ivorces sought by persons in Q uebec and  N ew foundland . W ith 
respect to  section 24, this section w ould  ap p ear to  be self-explanatory.
Section 25 is concerned w ith transitiona l provisions an d  tim e 
does not perm it a d iscussion o f  th is section a t this particu lar m om ent. 
Section 26 m erits som e consideration . It w ould ap p ear th a t in the 
Province o f  New Brunswick all subsisting legislation on  divorce is 
effectively repealed upon  com m encem ent o f  Bill C-187. H ow ever, 
existing rem edies relating  to  dam ages for adu ltery , se ttlem ent o f  
p roperty , an d , in general, ju risd ic tio n  an d  pow ers in m atrim onial 
causes o th e r th an  divorce are  expressly preserved by section 26 (2).
